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The Large Gaps  
in Development in Kenya
Bernard Calas
Translated by Geoffrey D. Hilton, Elliot Brennan & Catherine S. Davis
The purpose of this chapter is not to re-examine each point previously 
discussed in 1998 in my contribution to Le Kenya Contemporain (Grignon 
& Prunier 1998). First, some of the characteristics of the country have not 
fundamentally changed: there is no need to revisit them. This chapter 
rather seeks to present the major geographic changes that have taken 
place in Kenya—which I call “the ageing” of places—with reference to the 
double ageing that the novelist Georges Pérec highlighted in his Des Lieux: 
that of my writing, and that of my own subjectivity. This contribution will 
thus be marked by these three forms of ageing but will focus solely on the 
dynamics of Kenya’s different areas. It will be less about “accounting for 
extreme diversity”—as was the case in 1998—but more about shedding light 
on the major geographic changes of the last 25 years by distinguishing two 
types of areas: the attractive and integrated areas, and the unattractive and 
marginalised ones.
Before all else, it is important to present two important factors that 
influence the majority of challenges in Kenya and Africa in general.
First of all, in 28 years, the Kenyan population has more than doubled, 
growing from 23  million inhabitants to nearly 53  million (Pison 2019)! 
These numbers should be considered carefully. Imagine if the population 
of France1 grew from its current 64 million people to 120 million in 2040… 
and, during the current migration “crisis,” imagine the debates, tensions, 
and changes begotten by such growth. This change is the most important 
and must be kept in mind. Kenya is obviously not the only country to have 
experienced this kind of boom. Indeed, the country’s growth was not the 
most significant in either relative or absolute terms. Neither unique nor 
extreme, the growth of the Kenyan population demonstrates the vitality of 
the African demographic transition, and this without falling into unseemly 
Malthusianism. Regardless from what angle we consider the country or the 
continent beyond, we must embrace this amasing vital dynamic that makes 
1. This text was originally published in French for a French-speaking audience: 




half the population younger than 18 years old! It places the politics of men 
and of numbers at the centre of debates and this perspective influences the 
analysis of inequality and development in Kenya. Furthermore, instead of 
opening with a discussion on the physical base, one should better introduce 
the people and their most important characteristics.
Next, it must be emphasised that Kenya is still, and will remain for decades, 
affected by development problems more than anything else. Of course, it 
has developed to the point of being struck off the list of Least Developed 
Countries (LDC). An average annual economic growth rate over 30 years of 
5-6% per year—despite declines and slowdowns due to political, climate, and 
cyclical risks—made it possible for the country’s GDP (67 billion USD, 68th 
globally) and GDP per capita (1,380 USD per capita) to rise. Nevertheless, it 
is still not an emerging market in the eyes of commercial banks and rating 
agencies. Although Kenya is no longer on the LDC list, analysts envisage 
it as one of the “African lions” (Mac  Kinsey 2013). Its elites expect the 
country to emerge around 2030 (Vision 2030) and flaunt their aspiration 
of joining the other “tigers” and Asian “dragons.” Yet the country remains 
fundamentally crippled by development problems. The slightest drought 
can lead to shortages and famines, with repercussions on the economy and 
society as a whole. A minor adverse El Niño-related weather event can 
paralyse the economy. Even if it is above the African average, Kenya’s HDI 
(0.548 that ranked 145th in the world in 2014; 0.43 in 1990 ranked 156th) 
remains relatively low. Its development is extremely unequally distributed, 
both socially and geographically: 45% of the population still live on less than 
2 USD per day and its Gini index (0.51), far from decreasing, is growing and 
makes it one of the most unequal societies in Africa. In total, the average 
Kenyan’s monthly income of USD 115 places it 140th in the world.
These two introductory ideas underline the importance of the changes 
in the way in which the country has faced three major challenges 
of development: demographic transition, economic diversification, 
and structural transformation to end its dependence on aid, but also 
environmental sustainability as growing needs push productivity beyond 
environmental limits in a context of intensified globalisation. The challenges 
have brought about changes—spectacular for some, subdued for others—
that must now be discussed.
1. First Challenge: Demographic Transition
In the 2009 census (before the most recent one of August 2019), the Kenyan 
population was growing at a rate of 2.8% per year, doubling every 25 years. 
Since then, according to international organisations, growth has decreased 
to 2.3% per year (Pison 2019). The Kenyan population is therefore in the 
midst of a demographic transition. Growth is decelerating (3.3% in 1990), 
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under the influence of the decreased birth rate, itself correlated with the 
decrease in the Total Fertility Rate (6.6 in 1990, 4.7 in 2009, 3.4 in 2019). 
Kenyans are having fewer children than their Ugandan and Tanzanian 
neighbours or than their parents. According to the last Demographic and 
Health Survey (2014), after stagnating for a decade and even rising back to 
4.6-4.9 children per woman at the end of the 1990s, the national fertility rate 
fell below 4 children per woman. This was the result of an increase in the 
uptake of contraceptive practices. At present, 60% of women older than 15 
use contraceptive methods, compared with a third in 2000. This increased 
uptake is partially due to the introduction of free primary schooling in 
2003. If the uptake of contraceptive practices continues at this rate, it may 
allow the country to benefit from a “population dividend.” This occurred 
in South-East Asia fifty years ago where it lowered the dependency ratio 
before it raised again due to the ageing population. For Kenya, this may 
quickly increase GDP per capita—the central measure of development.
The growing use of contraception is combined with the slight rise in 
the age at marriage (20 years old), the rise of the age at first birth, and the 
decline of the proportion of teenage pregnancies (from 12.7% in 1990 to 9% 
today), all linked to tangible women’s empowerment. Infant mortality has 
also decreased (from 98‰ in 1990 to 79‰ in 2009 to 35‰ in 2019; see Pison 
2019), improving children’s chances of survival. Classically, improvement 
of girls’ education results in a decline in women’s desire to have children, 
and an increase of inter-birth intervals.
However, the geography of this demographic transition and the 
decrease in birth rates and fertility show a clear contrast between the 
Central Highlands and the rest of the country. In the counties of Meru and 
Kirinyaga, more than 70% of women have access to contraception while, 
in the lowlands of the north-north-east (counties of Wajir, Mandera, and 
Garissa) less than 7% of women use it. The Western Highlands, the Great 
Rift Valley, and the Coast are in the middle.
Life expectancy, after having fallen to 51 years old in 2000 due to the 
effects of the AIDS pandemic, has risen back to 67 years old, which marks 
entry in the post-AIDS period. However, some 1.6 million people still have 
HIV in Kenya. Large geographic inequalities in the struggle against death 
have appeared: in the Lake Victoria region, particularly in Luo lands, HIV 
prevalence remains high.
Has Growth Changed the Spatial Distribution  
of the Kenyan Population?
In 2009, the average density of Kenya was 66 people per square kilometre. 
This is meaningless, given the large differential between, for instance, the 
rural density of Vihiga county with Asian-like levels of 973 people per 
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square kilometre in 2009, and the quasi-Saharan levels of Marsabit with 4 
people per square kilometre. High densities are centred in the highlands, 
particularly in the west (Kisii 877; Nyamira 659; Bungoma 452; Kakamega 
546; Trans-Nzoia 324) but also in the eastern slopes of the Central 
Highlands (Nyeri 204; Kirinyaga 352; Muranga 366; Meru 193; Embu 180; 
Machakos 175; even Makueni 109). These higher densities correspond with 
the Luhya, Kisii, Kikuyu, and Kamba lands. The foothills and fringes of 
these highlands (Baringo 50; West Pokot 56; Laikipia 46; Narok 47) and the 
coast are in the middle (Kwale 78; Kilifi 87). The lowest densities (often less 
Figure 1. Usage of modern contraceptive methods
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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than 10 people per square kilometre) are spread across the northeastern 
half of the country.
Fundamentally, the dynamics that were identified 25 years ago still 
hold: densification in already populated areas, pioneer fronts that are 
spontaneously loosening on the margins, migrations towards agrarian 
townsites from the old ‘White Highlands’, along with urbanisation through 
the creation of new towns, through the increasing size of existing towns, 
and the sprawl of suburbs and urban peripheries of the biggest cities. The 
Brownian motion is accentuated and polytopic ways of life have multiplied, 
Figure 2. Map of population densities
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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facilitated by mobile telephony (89% of Kenyans had a mobile telephone 
number in 2017) and the improvement of automobile accessibility in 
many areas of the country. However, use of mobile phones, the Internet, 
the boda boda and the matatu have not radically upset the density map. 
The crowded highlands are becoming increasingly crowded while the arid 
lowlands of the north and the north-east are still relatively empty, even 
though the density is increasing. Two-thirds of the Kenyan population 
used to live above 1,500 m. Although this has now fallen to 1,200 m, the 
famous butterfly-shaped highlands remain the home of the majority of the 
population, together with the coastal border.
This does not mean that Kenyans are not moving, however. In 2009, 
20% of Kenyans did not live in their county of birth. At the county level, 
mobility numbers express the different level of attractiveness of the regions. 
Unsurprisingly, the less attractive areas are in the arid and sometimes 
unsafe parts of north-eastern Kenya (Mandera, Wajir), the north (Turkana, 
Marsabit) and the small farms areas in semi-arid parts of the east (Kitui, 
and to a small extent Makueni or Tharaka on the eastern piedmont of 
Mt Kenya). The only exceptions in this unattractive environment are the 
Dadaab camps populated by Somali refugees (Meyerfeld 2016; Chkam 2016, 
79-97), county seats, and border checkpoints. In contrast, the attractiveness 
of the Lamu-Garsen region is tied to its large harbour and agricultural 
projects. Uasin Gishum, Elgoyo Marakwet, Trans-Nzoia, Nyandarua, and 
Laikipia are also attractive counties: farmers establish there, sometimes on 
the White Highlands or at the expense of forests and protected lands that 
were delisted at the start of the 2000s, and as a result of the creation of 
several displaced persons camps from the 2007–08 crisis. The net migration 
in the cities of Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret, and Nakuru but also 
in the central areas around the capital (suburban countries of Kiambu and 
Kajiado) underline how important cities have become to Kenyans. This 
urban attractiveness can be found on all scales: for example, more than 
half of the inhabitants of Isiolo, a town set in the arid foothills to the north 
of Mt Kenya (Samburu and Shaba region)—generally not a particularly 
attractive area—were born in another county. Likewise, the migration maps 
of the Socio-Economic Atlas of Kenya (Wiesmann, Kiteme & Mwango 2014, 
38-39) show the attractiveness of Namanga, Oliotoktok, Kasigau, Maralal, 
Marsabit, or even Lodwar, and of a whole series of small and medium-sized 
towns (Calas 2007, 3-22).
Indeed, one of Kenya’s decisive trends today is urbanisation—in the 
same as in the rest of Africa. It affects both men (and women) and places. 
The population is urbanising at a rate of 4% per year. Firstly, this is due to a 
daily increase in the number of people living in cities resulting from natural 
growth and moderate rural exodus. Secondly, urbanisation concerns areas 
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where the small towns become denser: a large range of activities are taking 
place in locations that previously were only cross-roads, weekly markets 
and police stations. The population is also urbanising because of increased 
mobility and because the ties thus created are “rurbanising” the countryside 
(Racaud, Nakileza, Bart & Charlery de la Masselière 2016)—that is, because 
the countryside is increasingly integrated with the urban world. As a result, 
the macrocephaly of the urban network is decreasing.
Figure 3. Map of attractive and unattractive counties
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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2. Second Challenge: Structural Diversification
This second challenge relates to the analysis of economic activity which, as 
it is linked to the issue of development, is about the reduction of dependence 
on primary materials and prices through economic diversification and by 
moving up industrial value chains, that is to say, through what is well 
known as “structural transformation.”
Table 1. Contributions to GNP and employment  












KENYA 1990 30 66 19 7 51 26 26 31 24
KENYA 2016 36 61 19 9 45 30 15 23 17
Sources: World Development Indicators Database, 3 January 2018.
The relative increase of the share of agriculture in GNP between 1990 
and 2016 is surprising as it seems to contradict not only the theories of 
development that promote structural transformation at the expense of 
agriculture and profits for manufacturers or service providers, but also 
ideas that development should rely upon industrialisation, the expansion of 
the tertiary sector, and de-agrarianisation (Bryceson & Van Der Laan 1994).
Far from declining in the production of wealth, agriculture is, in fact, 
progressing even though the GDP is growing by 5% per year! The concurrent 
relative shrinkage of agriculture’s contribution to employment confirms 
the improvement of agricultural productivity. However, it is important 
to remember that in absolute terms, the number of people working in 
agriculture has increased substantially even though farmlands have not 
extended in proportion, which implies an actual increase in yields. This 
joint growth of productivity and agricultural yields underlines the extent to 
which agricultural transformation is at the heart of the dynamic of growth 
and development in Kenya.
Some people in the countryside are becoming big farmers and even 
agrobusinessmen. This transformation takes the intensification route: 
better crop varieties (but not GMOs yet), more extensive and careful use 
of inputs, and shorter crop rotations along with more frequent use of small 
hydropower are all part of this dynamic. This is made possible through 
the integration of defined areas (terroirs) in a number of national, regional, 
and global value chains and to the production in Kenya of products with 
higher added values, notably through the procurement of certificates for 
selected products. The rise of cash-subsistence crops for urban areas, “the 
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supermarket’s revolution,” the emergence of East African agri-food trade 
(mainly legumes and grains), the multiplication of shipping contracts for 
fruits and vegetables to be exported fresh or packaged, frozen or tinned, 
and horticultural investment all determine the increased value of labour, 
land, water, and agricultural production. Green beans, mangetout, onions, 
basil, roses, milk thistle, mangos, pineapples, wheat, corn, chicken, etc. find 
their way to markets in major cities in Kenya, East Africa, Europe, Russia, 
Japan, or Arabia, thereby allowing farmers to improve their conditions. 
This integration has come about through the opening of the localised 
areas (terroirs) to traffic, contracts, credit, bank accounts, small scale 
irrigation equipment, cold storage rooms, and to better access to inputs. It 
is supported by the Kenyan government’s proactive strategy to improve its 
network of agricultural technicians tasked to mercilessly enforce Western 
importers’ prescriptive requirements regarding Maximum Residue Levels2 
and quality in order to open new markets for export. These commercial 
and productive reconfigurations complicate technical farm trajectories for 
which diversification is becoming widespread. They accentuate rural socio-
economic contrasts while favouring the structuring of the countryside 
into production basins that reduce the Kenyan agricultural geography 
of agricultural belts. However, the rural socio-economic contrast is not 
totally eradicated due to the resilience of some localised areas (terroirs) that 
specialise in coffee production and the successful production of tea.
The time has passed when Kenya’s post-colonial economy was 
dominated by coffee and tea: these two crops represent no more than 30% 
of export revenues and this decrease in overall share of production shows 
the extent of recent diversification and structural transformation. However, 
the two still play an important role in many farmers’ access to cash. Despite 
pessimistic predictions, coffee has not disappeared, even if it is shrinking 
around the best-performing coffee factories that play the label card 
(Barjolle, Quinones-Ruiz, Bagal & Comoé 2017, 105-119), quality label, and 
even prestige origin labelling. Above 1,800 m, tea crops have progressed in 
profiting from high prices and the performance of Kenyan tea.
Thus, far from being homogeneous, Kenyan agriculture has various 
production speeds: large agricultural holdings with more than 20 ha (27% of 
the value of commercial agricultural production)—which were sometimes 
inherited from the large colonial estates (tea, coffee) or result from recent land 
investment (sugar cane, market gardening, biofuel)—coexist and compete 
with commercial farmers often from the cooperative sector or from contract 
farming; and a multitude of smallholders who combine as much as they can 
subsistence and cash farming in varied proportions. They often diversify in 




an attempt to escape the hard lot of farmers or smallholders, who often live 
in the arid or semi-arid borderlands or the hinterlands landlocked by the 
coast and devoid of the resources of commercial integration such as pluri-
activity. Agriculture reflects Kenyan society: fragmented and profoundly 
unequal. At the same time, it is the most important sector of the economy 
contributing 60% of export revenue, and the most important segment of 
society in that it provides an often poorly paid and precarious living to 
the majority of Kenyans. Consequently, the economic and social future of 
the country rests on agriculture. In light of this, agriculture should be the 
focus of decision-makers and development brokers. This is also why the 
two most important factors of agricultural production—land and water—
are at the heart of Kenya’s development issues.
On average, terms of trade are becoming increasingly unfavourable for 
agricultural products: from the index of 100 in 2001, they fell to 49 in 2016! 
Only the exacerbation of contrasts and inequalities, within the agricultural 
sector itself, can at the same time explain the growth of agriculture’s 
contribution to the GDP and the global deterioration of the terms of trade.
Table 2. Evolution of performance of colonial commercial crops
2006 2011 1016
Coffee
Price (KES) for a 100 kg 




Cooperatives 128,888 85,000 88,000
Plantations 42,000 25,000 26,000
Production 
(Tonnes)
Cooperatives 27,000 27,000 30,000






Price (KES) for a 100 kg 




Cooperatives 95,000 125,000 140,000
Plantations 51,000 65,000 80,000
Production 
(Tonnes)
Cooperatives 191,000 218,000 265,000
Plantations 120,000 151,000 207,000
Yields  
(Kg/ha)
Cooperatives 2,225 2,037 2,084
Plantations 2,700 2,953 2,908
Sources: KNBS Economic Survey 2011 and 2016.
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Table 3. Change in indices of the main agricultural types  
of production in quantity and value (index 100 in 2001)
2005 2009 20013 2016
Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value
Grains 105 109 66 171 98 227 95 213
Sugar 123 95 139 132 146 167 172 169
Horticulture 179 93 197 106 223 165 277 151
Tea/Coffee 105 100 101 162 119 218 146 217
Meat/milk 150 128 179 147 260 261 328 321
Sources: KNBS Economic Survey 2011 and 2016.
Table 4. Exports (weight and value) of cut flowers, fruits, and vegetables
2005 2012 2016
Flowers
81,000 t. 108,000 133,000
23 billion 65 billion 71 billion
Fruits
18,000 t. 31,000 t. 50,000 t.
2 billion 5 billion 7 billion
Vegetables
64,000 t. 66,000 t. 80,000 t.
14 billion 20 billion 23 billion
Sources: KNBS Economic Survey 2011 and 2016.
Landscapes3
Following the increase of human and agricultural development, natural 
landscapes have practically disappeared and only really exist in protected 
areas (15% of Kenya’s territory): or, on the decline, they are being eroded 
by the stubble-burning of charcoal makers in dry regions with low pastoral 
densities, as for example in the Nyaki desert between Mombasa and Voi, 
where wood charcoal is a fast, but predatory, path to profit. However, 
cultivated areas cover no more than 20% of the territory.
The Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu lands remain the agricultural heart of 
the country. The commercial orientation of this agriculture is recognised 
and intensification is at its height. Following the abandonment of coffee 
plantations, the polycultural diversification of large holdings, their opening 
to commercial sectors, the involvement of agricultural households in non-
agricultural activities, and often polytopic multi-activity have reinforced 
a multitude of small commercial urban centres linked by genuine linear 
desakotas along the roads. On a smaller scale, these dynamics form a genuine 
agro-urban region centred around Nairobi (Calas, 2004): the strategies of 
3. See Said, Okwi, Ndeng’e, Agatsiva & Kilele (2007).
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sectoral or spatial overlapping related to Brownian movements integrate the 
terroirs into a large area harnessed to the capital city. This homogenisation 
impedes neither unequalisation between farmers of the same village, nor 
the emergence of landless farmers, nor the relative specialisation of specific 
productive basins in terms of physical amenities and technical solidarity.
In the West (Luhya, Luo, Teso, and Kisii lands), crop combinations are 
very complex and oriented towards subsistence intensification adapted to 
extremely high densities, to the low scale of land holdings, to the relative 
poverty of many farmers, and to a lesser integration if compared to the 
Central Province and its commercial networks. There, people strive to 
minimise subsistence risks and to diversify farming on smaller and smaller 
plots by relying on old agricultural know-how and fine-tuning farming. For 
example, the commonly used corn/sorghum combination allows farmers to 
prevent their crops from being ravaged by corn borers.
Agroforestry and bocage dominate the highland landscapes. Contrary to 
the widely accepted perception, trees are spreading, and this is especially 
true of faster-growing species (grevillea mainly, even if numerous projects 
expect to restore native trees).
In the lowlands, vast, parched and scrubland, attacked by the axes of 
charcoal producers and the buckets of diggers highly contrast with the 
green ribbons of irrigated lands. In between these two extremes, one finds 
semi-arid regions such as, for instance, in Ukambani or the Tugen region 
where drillings and wells allow citrus orchards and mango trees to thrive 
and alternate with traditional pluvial grain farming, often cultivated in 
terraces (Tiffen, Mortimore & Gichuki 1994).
However, this agricultural performance does not contradict the growth 
of manufacturing or services. In these sectors, diversification has occurred, 
even if it has been partially hidden on the macroeconomic scale.
As the driving force of employment (Twining-Ward, Li, Bhammar & 
Wright 2018) and an early diversified sector, tourism has also undergone 
diversification. The mass tourism of 1970–1980 is now combined with more 
distinctive kinds of tourism underpinned by a diversification of activities 
offered, notably Outdoor Physical Activities (Calas 2015). However, being 
very sensitive to political and security risks, Kenya’s international image 
has suffered due to the Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Nairobi (2013), 
the attack at Garissa University College, and the Al-Shabaab attacks in the 
Lamu region (2014). Faced with this situation, tour operators have reoriented 
themselves to cater to domestic and African tourists. While not a perfect 
substitute for the previous tourist flows—hotel occupancy rates (6 million 
overnight stays with capacity for around 20 million) remain notoriously 
low—they allow hotels to maintain the minimum level of activity necessary 
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to remain open all year round and maintain tourist infrastructure. However, 
since 2016, the international situation has slowly been improving.
In terms of the number of guests, tourism is mainly focused on the coast 
and its white sands, its coconut trees, its turquoise waters, its transparent 
lagoons, and even its nightclubs—which is typical of a tropical destination; 
yet, in a less expected way, the capital city is the second destination 
chosen by tourists. Being a national airport hub but also due to its many 
conferences and symposiums, Kenya’s capital looms large in the country’s 
tourist geography. National parks and animal reserves are only the third 
Figure 4. Land use in Kenya
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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most important destination. Notwithstanding, fauna and nature are the 
emblem of Kenya as a destination in the international market: they shape 
tourism and, through it, the country itself.
In the cities, the growing number of malls and supermarkets, the rise 
in the value of manufacturing, the financialisation of the economy, the 
relative openness to high-tech industries, to artistic industries, and business 
process outsourcing, all embody the diversification of the secondary and 
tertiary sectors. However, they must not—in turn—conceal the informal 
sector, small scale street vending, handicrafts, domestic work (Lanne 2018), 
Figure 5. Protected forests and protected animal areas
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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recycling, and even petty theft that provide an income to the majority of 
urban residents. “Coders,” the “iHub” teleworking platform, the future 
“Silicon Savannah” (Johari 2015), French and Chinese investors amongst 
others, are attracted by the authorities’ pro-business attitudes and by the 
prowess of the “start-up nation.” Whilst they delight in trade forums and 
their employees frequent stylish bars in the city, the majority of urban 
residents remain concerned about poor employment opportunities, misery 
and the daily insecurity of “jua kali.” Of course, factories have flourished 
and the road between Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and Nairobi city 
centre is no more than a succession of warehouses, factories, showrooms, 
conference centres, and business hotels that employ a significant portion 
of the population. But the day-to-day workers and subcontractors wander 
along the edge of the city’s roads before dawn and again late in the evening, 
hoping to save money on public transport by walking. Nairobi appeared in 
the ranking of global competitive cities (115th out of 120, 5th in Africa after 
Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and Cairo according to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit in 2012) but many women in Nairobi stand at the roadside 
selling small piles of tomatoes and onions and their second-hand clothes or 
plastic Chinese products. In the gaps between the industrial zones, slums 
like Mukuru—less iconic than Mathare or Kibera, yet all the more squalid—
are entrenching themselves. Despite their spectacular intrusion into urban 
landscapes, the notably architectural landmarks of economic success do not 
change the sectoral power relations that pull more than 80% of the workers 
entering the urban labour market into the informal sector and precarious 
work sector. The rhetoric about the emergence of a Kenyan middle class is 
over-optimistic and a myth (Darbon & Toulabor 2014). In effect, if 10% of 
the population earns more than 5,000 USD per year, that means that 90% 
earns less. A large floating population—with incomes just more than 2 USD 
per day—has certainly emerged from poverty, yet without reaching middle 
class. Is that to say that we are dealing with illusory development? How 
does this make up society?
Beyond the cosmopolitanism of Nairobi and other large cities, urban 
landscapes display in nuanced ways an increasingly complex social 
stratification: sheet metal slums, tenement cities of concrete and greyish 
basalt blocks (Hurzschmeyer 2007), housing developments of semi-detached 
dwellings, groups of posh buildings, towers, and gated communities are all 
side by side, separated by walls and railings, by bigger and bigger avenues 
that receive more and more traffic, urban highways, and bypasses that do 
not prevent traffic jams but only mitigate the delays.
The classical dynamics of a liberal metropolis govern urban extension. The 
cleaning of the CBD (Morange 2015, 247-269), the emergence of alternative 
centralities (Westlands and Upper Hill), segregated urban sprawl, and 
Bernard Calas
90
generalised bunkerisation, all suggest a Brazil-type metropolisation, as far 
as urban mega-projects are plenty (Saraswati 2014), such as the new Tatu 
City (built on old coffee plantations on the initiative of an investment fund) 
or the Two Rivers Mall that hosts a Carrefour hypermarket. The role of 
China in a massive 800-million-dollar real estate project bolsters this idea 
of Nairobi’s liberal metropolisation. These urban megaprojects embody 
to the extreme the growing gap between the often-closed-minded visions 
which are occasionally realised in the form of localised enclaves, and the 
ordinary reality of the majority of Nairobi’s inhabitants (Watson 2013, 215-
231; Jaglin, Didier & Dubresson 2018).
This economic diversification goes together with a reorientation of 
customers and suppliers. As Europe becomes less dominant, and the 
countries of the sub-region and COMESA become important commercial 
partners, Asia, now represents half of the imports (notably petroleum 
products from the Gulf and manufactured goods from China and India).
Table 5. Commercial deficit and commercial balance in 2016
Exports 500 billion KES Imports 1,400 billion KES
Tea 120 Oil 183 (300 in 2014)
Flowers 110 Animal fats 53
Textiles 30 Plastics 60
Coffee 21 Machines 253






Steel 13 Steel 75
Source: KNBS Economic Survey 2011 and 2016.






(China 25% of total imports)
Other 10%
Sources KNBS Economic Survey 2011 and 2016.
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3. Third Challenge: Environmental Sustainability in a 
context of Pressure on the Environment
Combined with the growth of the population, these geoeconomic changes 
require the intensification and broadening of exploitation activities, even 
putting pressure on the environment in order to increase productivity. 
This concerns not only the surface but also the substrate, that is to say, the 
subsurface and the lower atmosphere. Productivity beyond environment 
limits necessitates drilling, catchments, levelling of the ground, the 
installation of pylons and antennas, the laying of cables and pipes, 
the construction of dams, of electricity grids, which are all signs of the 
increasing anthropisation of the environment. However, for the last thirty 
years, the paradigm of sustainability has been imposed on the world’s 
development agenda, which means that increasing productivity should 
ideally be “eco-economic friendly.” The question is therefore no longer to 
describe the environment as such but to focus on exploitation operations 
and the relationship between humans and their environment, as well as the 
tensions that these relationships stir up, considering also the regulations 
that target them.
Decision-makers, environmental lobbies and the civil society worry 
about deforestation and its effects, the reduction of wild fauna, the erosion 
of biodiversity, the increasing risks of, most notably, floods and erosion, 
and generally the accentuation of the negative externalities of Kenya’s 
development. This is why, in the wake of the Brundtland report (World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987), environmental 
requirements were imposed on development projects and programmes 
in Kenya like in the rest of the world. In the South, Socio-Environmental 
Impact Assessments (SEIA) became widespread, environmental clean-ups 
or at least their monstration were made obligatory to the point that the 
environmental concern is no longer limited to conservationist circles, but 
permeates the entire economy.
Of course, the common classification produced by the “tropico-
developmentalist” ideology of the 1950s-1960s that distinguished nine 
agro-ecological zones by combining physical diagnostics and agricultural 
objectives is still relevant to understand the country. However, it must 
be pushed further by observing the physical potentialities and the ways 
these are turned into commodities, and then into resources. This trend is 
brought about by the increase of needs caused by the combined pressure of 
demographic and economic growth. The top commodities converted into 
resources are water, fossil fuels, renewable energy sources, biodiversity, 
and mineral matter. For the last 30 years, they have been—and continue 
to be—the central issues of Kenyan development. Today they point to its 
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contradictions and tensions even more significantly—or perhaps more 
explicitly—than before. The result is that a certain number of places with 
these potential resources are becoming “eco-economic” hot spots and 
concentrate some of Kenya’s geopolitical issues.
The whole of Kenya suffers from water scarcity as its renewable water 
resources amount to less than 1,000  m3 per person per year (Bates et al. 
2008, 93–94). As a consequence, hydrous potentials have become important 
issues and hydro-political hot spots. The most important of these hot spots 
are the country’s “water towers,” that is to say, the major mountainous 
ranges: Mt Kenya (5,199 m), Mt Elgon (4,321 m), the Mau Forest and the 
Aberdares (4,000 m), and the Cherangani Hills (see also Rouillé-Kielo in this 
volume). These ranges where it rains more and more often than elsewhere 
(2,300 mm at 2,000 metres high on the southeast face of Mt Kenya) have 
bogs and forests that, like sponges, slowly release water, supporting the 
flows of springs and rivers that diverge from them. Deforestation and 
land clearing, therefore, impact the water balance of these mountains by 
diminishing retention efficiency, even though total rainfall may increase. As 
a consequence, the rivers originating from these mountains, their high and 
low water patterns, as well as lakes, have become a centre of attention and 
controversy, of debates and passionate polemics. Yet, the trend has returned 
to hydroelectric dams that also create irrigation reservoirs for downstream 
agricultural areas (Tharaka Dam) and the large flat areas that border them 
are coveted by large property developers (Leauthaud et al. 2013).
From the Sahara to the United States, deep fossil aquifer exploitation has 
also become common. How would Kenya escape this trend? The discovery 
of the Lotikipi basin aquifer in northern Turkana has thus been a windfall 
for the people in a region that is regularly threatened by droughts but 
also—but less publicised—by the disastrous effects of the construction of 
Ethiopian hydroelectric dams in the Omo valley.4 Even more discretely, it 
certainly serves as a windfall for the oil companies that will need large 
volumes of water to extract oil in the depths of Lake Turkana (see more 
below).5 Kenyan hydro-politics are particularly heated and conflicts around 
water resources are multiplying, constituting an especially pertinent part 
of the analysis of power relations (Rouillé, Blanchon, Calas & Temple-
Boyer 2015). The conflicts about the usage of water from Lake Naivasha 
4. Since 2015, hydroelectric and hydraulic initiatives in the Ethiopian Omo 
Valley have lowered the water level of Lake Turkana by over 1.5 metres and 
this will likely occur again, reducing the surface of the lake in the areas with 
the most fish (Human Rights Watch -14 February 2017). This could turn Lake 
Turkana into an African Aral Sea just as giant agricultural projects such as Give 
IV (the largest dam in Africa) and Give V are being built.
5. 4/5 barrels of water are needed to produce a barrel of oil.
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Figure 6. The physical base and its “eco-economic friendly” commodities
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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and Lake Baringo and the conflicts between residents living upstream or 
downstream of the Ewaso Ng’iro or Tana rivers, are textbook cases of a 
myriad of hydro-political conflicts.
Towards a Green Kenya? The Energy Problem and the Electricity Mix
The growth of energy needs requires an increased use of energy resources 
that punctuate the country’s geography with extraction and exploitation 
sites. In effect, the growing pressure of needs combined with the 
diversification of technical capabilities is transforming certain aspects of 
Figure 7. The agro-ecological zones
Bernard Calas, Valérie Alfaurt, 2019.
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the environmental resources which a short while ago were considered to 
be of no interest. As with most African countries, energy is chief among the 
preoccupations of decision-makers such as investors. Investment experts 
point to the Kenyan electricity sector as a growth market, ranked 4th on 
the continent (Havas Horizon 2016). The objective is to increase electrical 
production to 15,000  megawatts in 2030. Rivers and streams coming 
down from the mountains, hot gases escaping the bowels of the Rift, the 
consistency and regularity of trade winds and sunshine, all allow Kenya 
to use clean electricity, which is relatively innovative on a world scale. In 
effect, 80% of electricity is produced thanks to renewable sources, topped 
by hydroelectricity, mainly from the upper and mid Tana, that provides at 
least 40% of the 2,200 megawatts produced, followed by geothermal energy 
(30% of the Kenyan electricity mix) (Berggren & Österberg 2017).
Having innovating in the Hell’s Gate site for more than 30 years, Kenya 
is now one of the world leaders in geothermal energy behind Iceland. 
Following the example underway in the Akira Valley near Naivasha, 14 sites 
are spread along the Rift Valley that must increase geothermic production 
to 10,000 MW.
Another path being explored is wind energy. In effect, the country has 
found itself with a major site for producing this kind of energy: the eastern 
bank of Lake Turkana. There, strong winds gust through the topographic 
threshold between the Kenyan highlands and the Ethiopian highlands 
before further accelerating thanks to the adiabatic effect of the vast heated 
body of water of Lake Turkana. Regular strong winds blow for years, 
constituting an amasing potential energy source (3,000 megawatts) in the 
process of being developed as a wind farm with a capacity of 310 megawatts 
as already been built in Loiyangalani.
The last path to increase renewable electricity production is solar. 
Of all energy sources, solar is the most versatile as it can combine two 
different approaches and technical options: large and small solar farms, and 
individual solar panels. When combined, these two types of production can 
help even out investments in energy grids by responding to the industrial 
and urban demand and connecting regions and even off-grid households. 
The state has shown that it understands the importance of this energy 
source when it required that all buildings that use more than 100 litres of 
water per day be equipped with solar water heaters. Private individuals, 
even in the depths of the jungle, can follow Premier League matches thanks 
to ingenious devices made from batteries and solar panels.
However, electricity is not synonymous with energetics and it must not be 
concluded from its rather virtuous energy mix that Kenya is in the process of 
becoming a green economy. Although it banned the export of wood charcoal 
in 1975, 70% of households still cook over wood fires using, on average, 
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between 1.4 and 2.4 m3 of wood charcoal per year which has contributed 
to accelerated stubble-burning and deforestation. Furthermore, they still 
largely light fires with paraffin wax which further increases greenhouse gas 
emissions. This nuance reveals the extreme discrepancy between, on the 
one hand, a modern society and economy connected, to some small extent, 
to globalisation and, on the other, the marginal majority of people who still 
make up Kenyan society and economy. Apart from such inequity, the current 
energetic model still has several weaknesses, notably because industrial 
growth and the increasing number of vehicles have caused oil imports to 
increase by 6% between 2004 and 2014. Moreover, fluctuating rainfall affects 
the level of dams and directly weakens the electricity supply of cities and 
industries. The resultant recurring power outages slow investments and at 
any rate cause over-expenditure for entrepreneurs.
In the days of the “Anthropocene” and the “6th extinction,” and as tourism 
brings in more than 20% of the country’s foreign currency reserves and 
contributes around 12% of its GDP, the protection of biodiversity has become 
a common refrain, a requirement, and a major issue. This explains why there 
are plenty of associations, lobbies, and interest groups that, in the name 
of that imperative, are working towards the protection of an emblematic 
animal, an exceptional place or even a specific habitat. To this day, the 
preferred spatial arrangement to achieve this goal remains the protected 
area, whether it is public (50% of Kenyan protected areas), private (25%), 
or communal (25%). The animal archipelago was formed in three phases: 
the colonial phase (1945–1963) and the post-colonial phase (1970s) that 
both created Kenya’s public patrimony (90% of wildlife tourists and 75% of 
revenues), then a third phase, starting in the 1980s and especially in the 2000s, 
during which large landowners and pastoral communities transformed their 
lands into conservancies. This recent dynamic is as important in terms of 
biodiversity as it is in terms of territorial organisation since it has allowed 
for the extension of protected areas as only 35% of fauna is protected within 
the limits of public areas (National Parks and National Reserves).
Moreover, most of the new protected areas are located in the arid and 
semi-arid regions where 20% of the population (and incidentally 80% of 
the livestock) reside, often in poverty. Conservation, if well managed, can 
constitute an economic alternative for these people. In these regions, we 
note therefore an almost paradoxical change in the growing besiegement 
of protected areas, but also their extension. Emblematic of this change: the 
Laikipia Plateau (Evans & Adams 2016), the surroundings of the Samburu-
Shaba, Amboseli, the Masai Mara and the northern mountains between 
Maralal and Marsabit. Vast areas combine pastoral activities and wildlife 
tourism, but the monotony of the savannah conceals the signs of land 
property.
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The viability of fauna in protected areas rests on three conditions: 
rejuvenation of the fauna gene pools in these increasingly beleaguered 
areas, incentive plans for conservation targeting neighbouring populations, 
and the establishment of collective governance that subsumes state and 
institutional land fragmentation. In short, the main issue at stake is 
integration of wildlife isolates into a territorial archipelagic system. The 
emergence of a wild fauna market to transport animals from one reserve 
to another, the efforts to turn the large mammals migratory corridors into 
sanctuaries, and the scientific and political networking of the conservancies 
all aim to try to resolve the contradiction between the necessity of cross-
fertilisation to ensure the renewal of the gene pools of these areas, and the 
growing isolation of these areas that reduces the scope of local biodiversity. 
They also aim to act as a political lobby capable of influencing ad hoc local 
collectives, county-level institutions and the state, whose preoccupation 
with development sometimes contradicts the necessity for environmental 
conservation.
A Rentier Future?
Since the mega-cycle of raw materials of the 2000s, all over the world, 
multinational oil and mining corporations—often with governmental 
blessing—have increased the number of explorations and investments in 
extractive industries, leading to the exploitation of more deposits. For now, 
the raw materials sector remains minor in Kenya. Even if titanium from 
Kwale and gold from the minor deposits in Transmara are added to the salt 
that has long been extracted from Magadi (mostly for the Japanese optics 
industry), Kenya is nothing like a rentier state. However, things could 
change, radically, due to the 1992 discovery of oil reserves in Lokichar in 
South Turkana (Augé, Nkayi & Médard 2013). The recoverable oil resources 
are valued at 750 million barrels and their exploitation is considered viable 
at 55  USD per barrel. In January  2018, after several years of diplomatic 
dithering, the exploitation of the Turkana reserves was relaunched. The 
geopolitical crises in Venezuela and Iran have increased the price per barrel 
back over 50 USD, Tullow has announced profits, and in April 2018, Total 
joined the project. This operation has accelerated the pre-exploration phase 
of Turkana’s oil field. Furthermore, “Total has confirmed its commitment 
to make the Lokichar-Lamu pipeline the only method of delivery of crude 
oil in Kenya from Lokichar fields” (Le Point 2018). The Turkana operation 
should, therefore, begin production at the start of 2022, after the completion 
of the 700 km pipeline linking each production unit to the coast. Kenya 
could then become, for better or worse, a rentier state!
The whole of these operations produces a planting of variable sized 
but territorialised enclaves that, together, accentuate one of the major 
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geographic characteristics of the country: its fragmentation. Yet, this is 
coupled with another contradictory dynamic: a dynamic of integration 
brought on by the need for the connection of these extractionary enclaves 
to meet growing globalisation.
4. Fourth Challenge: Multiscale Integrations, 
Construction of the State, and National Solidarity
It is not sufficient to produce, exploit, and extract resources. Distribution, 
allocation, and commercialisation are also necessary for techno-commercial 
networks. Yet, these are Kenya’s weak points—which is typical of developing 
countries.
Despite appreciated progress with regards to the economic environment, 
investors continue to point out the recurrence of outages and load shedding 
as a weakness (World Bank 2019). Progress in production is not yet 
sufficient. As such, the wind farm already in place in Lonyangalani serves 
no purpose for the moment since the electrical lines that carry current to 
consumers have not been installed! Once again, we see a white elephant.
But beyond these setbacks, logistical integration is progressing. The 
road network is expanding and strengthening thanks to the East African 
Community along with multilateral and bilateral donors, Chinese among 
others. The widespread asphalting of roads, the inroad of motorway and 
peripheral bypasses, the construction of fly-overs and other massive 
roundabouts improve traffic flow, reduce congestion, and promote national 
integration.
Further, new technologies that Kenyans have quickly adopted (67% 
regularly use the internet and 89% have a mobile phone plan) are intensifying 
the links between areas, promoting polytopism and contributing to 
integration. At the global scale, the country has innovated by experimenting, 
since 2007, through the M-Pesa system, with electronic transactions to the 
point that today, half of the GDP moves through this channel and two-
thirds of the population would use money kiosks to deposit and transfer 
money. However, even as 60% of the population has an account, at the same 
time, 80% does not have access to mortgage lending.
Since the 1990s, the acceleration of globalisation has reinforced integrative 
dynamics and a complex interdependence between the states of the world. 
On the East African scale, they are reinforcing Kenya’s integration with 
its subregion. For the last 30 years already, the country’s economy has 
relied upon transit activities, focusing on the pivotal role of the Mombasa-
Nairobi-Busia/Malaba corridor for the subregional geography (220 million 
people). This corridor has been strengthened: The railway has been rebuilt, 
the Mombasa-Kisumu pipeline is being modernised, and the Mombasa-
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Nairobi high-voltage power line has been built. The road is regularly re-
surfaced (Porhel & Léon 2013) and the links between the coastline and 
the continental hinterlands have been considerably improved. Today, this 
corridor still serves as the backbone of the country and in 2012, 91% of 
GDP was produced within 100 km of it. The volume of goods that passes 
through Mombasa comes close to 30 million tonnes (10 million tonnes in 
2003), which makes it the second largest port in sub-Saharan Africa and 
more than 700 lorries cross the Ugandan border at Malaba each day.
Globalisation has also tightened links between Kenya and its Ugandan 
and Tanzanian neighbours. For 20 years, the institution-building of the East 
African Community has laid the foundation for a “New East Africa” (Fouéré 
& Maupeu 2015), which materialised in the construction of the Namanga-
Taveta border checkpoints, the largest connection with the Tanzanian 
and Ugandan road networks. On the regional scale, the flow of goods and 
peopled has been reinforced while certain tariff and customs barriers have 
been eliminated. Since 2005, the Machakos Protocol for peace agreements 
has permitted the extension of Kenyan commercial and banking networks 
towards Juba and South Sudan, networks that are dormant today due to the 
civil war, but are real, nonetheless (Calas, Racaud & Torretti 2016). Likewise, 
in the north, the interconnections of electric grids and asphalt-coated road 
networks are integrating Kenya with the sub-region’s other dominant 
economy: Ethiopia. Finally, since 1990, the Somali crisis and its surges 
have intensified Somali investment in Nairobi, the city thus becoming the 
“Global Somali Hub.” The boom of Eastleigh—Nairobi’s Little Mogadishu—
can be explained by the convergence of three factors on different scales: 
the strength of transnational Somali networks, the momentum of the 
Kenyan economy and housing market, and the emergence of Asia as the 
world’s factory (Carrier 2016). Furthermore, the Somali crisis has allowed 
the Kenyan economy to continue to profit from humanitarian operations.
This integration is increasing towards a very dynamic and populous 
East African space (220  million people), the opening of the southern 
borders of countries of the Horn and the rise in traffic have imposed the 
modernisation of new infrastructure on the coast. In Mombasa, the port’s 
capacity has been increased thanks to the construction of a new container 
terminal of 450,000 TEU. In the north, the digging of a new deep-water port 
is creating a new development corridor, from Lamu to the north-western 
borders and beyond, to South Sudan and Ethiopia: the famous LAPSSET 
(Coloma 2013; Fouéré & Maupeu 2015; see also Maupeu in this volume). In 
this context, Isiolo, 400 km further west, is thought of as a junction between 
this corridor and the Nairobi-Addis road (Pan African Highway). Currently 
planned are 6,500 acres for a new seaside resort, a new dam on the Ewas 
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Ngiro, a slaughterhouse with a capacity of 400 heads of cattle per day, and 
an international airport.
This infrastructure and these projects demonstrate the importance of 
major works and especially the large corridors of opening-up, the growth 
of “eco-economic” approaches harnessed to development rhetoric, and the 
legitimisation and funding of the elites. In 2017, President Uhuru Kenyatta 
and his Vice-President William Ruto campaigned on the finalisation 
of large infrastructure projects, such as the Nairobi-Mombasa train 
line. Cooperation with China was cast as a major success of Kenyatta’s 
presidency, underlining the link between land use policy, territorialisation 
of the state, and electoral politics.
Integration in globalisation is noticeable in the balance of payments in a 
rather ambivalent way. The remittances of emigrants represent the second-
largest source of foreign currency growing from 139 million USD in 1990 to 
1,700 million USD, 3% of the GDP.6 The growth of FDI to 400 million USD 
from 57 million USD in 1990 underlines the increasing attractiveness of the 
country for globalised investors. However, aid remains at a high level at 
2,200 million USD (compared to 1,181 in 1990) and demonstrates how much 
the country still depends on aid. Likewise, as debt servicing has diminished 
(falling from 36% to 10% of exports), the public debt has exploded, now 
representing more than half of GDP and Chinese lenders now more than 
3/4 of the creditors.
Beyond this economic, financial, logistical, and multiscale territorial 
integration, the question is now how the benefits of growth are being 
distributed. In effect, it is through redistributive mechanisms, notably 
taxation, land use planning, and the sharing of powers between different 
administrative layers, compounded by decentralisation in 2013, that draw 
on contours of national solidarity as well as the effectiveness of nation-
building thanks to the windfall of economic growth. This question is 
obviously an excuse for debates and intense bargaining, on different scales, 
between different actors.
One of these debates between foreign corporations and the government 
revolves around the corporate tax rate. The rate envisioned by the 
government, between 30 and 37.5% of capital transactions, is evidently 
thought to be too high and prohibitive by oil companies and generally 
by private corporations in all other sectors. In this way, plans to tax 
horticulturalists have provoked an exodus towards Ethiopia, fiscally the 
lowest bidder. Another debated point is the nature of taxation. Should 
6. As opposed to emigrants in other African countries such as Morocco, Kenyan 
emigrants do not represent a significant part of the populations (500,000 people 
are less than 2% of the population) but their remittances are an important part 
of the nation’s accounts.
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capital transactions or transactions in the financial market be taxed? The 
government favours the latter (5% instead of 30/37%) since corporations 
have an incentive to go public, which would have the collateral effect of 
energising Nairobi’s stock exchange.
Furthermore, in the context of the stabilisation of rules surrounding 
the 2010 Constitution and the decentralisation of 2013, a second level 
of discussion pits the central government, the county governments, and 
productive municipalities against each other. It seems that for the moment, 
tax sharing is favourable enough to the intermediate level of the counties. 
Does this mean it will be good for citizens? Won’t it be better for local 
notables and potentates?
More or less, these debates on the allocation of the benefits of growth 
also find themselves in the conservationist sphere. How do populations 
engage in animal conservation and how are they rewarded for their agreed 
efforts? Around Masai Mara, conservancies are managed on the basis 
of contracts between traditional landowners and tourism investors. The 
latter pay between 37 and 50 USD per hectare, per year, for 10 to 15 years. 
Even if this system solidifies the land monopolisation established by Masai 
elites when communal lands are subdivided, it improves local population’s 
perception of fauna and no doubt of the sustainability of its protection and 
development as a tourist site. However, they now wonder about the identity 
of the representatives of these famous “local communities” and the borders 
of these “communities” themselves.
These tensions about sharing the benefits of growth and about political 
representation form the context in which a localised civil society is 
emerging. This civil society use these questions as opportunities to engage 
with debates that point to national and even international integration. Local 
elites and intermediary bodies are taking full advantage of their abilities to 
mobilise their zealots or external support to pressure companies and the 
central government in view of gaining access to the benefits of predation. 
Thus, in 2013, Turkana notables incited young people to pillage the Tullow 
oil exploration sites. Still, in 2013, it was in the forest of Arabuko-Sokoke 
in Kilifi county that local authorities successfully limited oil explorations 
by invoking their Unesco biosphere reserve. The following year, in 2014, 
the notables of the Kerio Valley organised protests to demand that the 
government hand over the communal property titles for the explored lands 
as a precondition for seismic exploration. This is only a common, localised 
process through which civil society, gathered around its notables and 




Malthus or Boserup, who will Kenya prove right? This paper illustrates 
few certainties as the reality of the situation offers us with as many 
reasons to be optimistic about the future as to make us worry. How do 
we reconcile Nairobi and the aridity of the North-East; how do we keep 
in mind Mukuru next to Muthaiga; how do we put together so disparate 
pieces of the Kenyan puzzle as the hyper-populated terroirs of Vihiga and 
the Laikipia ranches? How can we consider the decentralisation of the 47 
counties and the simultaneous reinforcement of presidentialism? Kenya 
seems to be caught between large investments and small ventures, between 
devolution and recentralisation, between the myth of a middle class, even 
one of new millionaires7 and despite a slow decline, the persistent spectre 
of extreme poverty (see Thibon in this volume). How do we critically report 
growing territorialisation but do justice to an ever-grander aspiration for 
more effective spatialisation (Jaglin 2007)? Indeed, if national integration 
is progressing well, territorial inequalities have not disappeared, and the 
reverse even seems to be true.
The Coast seems to be the archetype of a more difficult region. The 
poverty rate there is 13% higher than the national average and only 38% 
of its inhabitants hold an ownership title compared to 62% for the rest of 
the Kenyan population. Politico-religious turmoil, economic frustrations, 
trafficking and mafia investments are the fertile ground for constant 
tensions ready to ignite at the slightest incident (see Willis and Mwakimoko 
in this volume). The northern coast and its hinterland (Garissa, Tana, 
and Lamu) have been especially impacted by incursions by Al Shabaab 
(Mpeketoni, 60 dead near Lamu—15 to 17 June 2014); interethnic insecurity 
is controlled through curfew. The Coast does not have a monopoly on 
tensions and interethnic violence may soon resume elsewhere, notably 
during elections when leaders wield identities for political ends, such as 
in Isiolo and Marsabit counties during the 2017 election campaign or in 
Laikipia, Uasin Gishu, or Elgeyo Marakwet when concurrent appetites for 
land collide, or shepherds and farmers confront each other. This violence 
especially affects the arid and semi-arid outskirts of the country that are 
unsafe, have been marginalised for a long time, and are subject to shifta and 
other cattle raids. Devolution, large projects, mining and oil prospecting, 
foreign investments, land allocations generally monopolised by highland 
residents or urban elites, and identity vexations stir resentment and can 
7. With a value of 500 million USD in 2016, Kenya is the second largest luxury 
market in Africa behind only South Africa (2.3 billion USD) (The Wealth Report 
2017, Knight Frank Johannesburg) and has the 4th highest number of millionaires 
in Africa after South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria and will attain 3rd place in 2026 
with about 17,000 millionaires.
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threaten the stability of these regions and can even impact on the stability 
of the whole country.
In contrast, in 2007, the World Economic Forum ranked Kenya 10th out of 
29 African countries using the criteria of global competitiveness. It showed 
that Kenya has the characteristics of an economy in transition between 
an economy dependent on commodity prices and global business cycles, 
and an economy based on innovation thanks to a qualified labour force, an 
innovative financial sector, and a green energy mix. Kenya is in the process 
of harvesting the fruits of its former investments in higher education.
Twenty years ago, I concluded with the idea that the Kenyan development 
model was tired. Since then, it has shown a certain degree of longevity that 
demonstrates its resilience. Should we conclude today that this model is a 
deceptive development model or, alternatively, an emerging development 
model?
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